This day in Civil War history {NEW}

RelicHound

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ill start this from scratch I reckon, its a shame we lost all the old stuff but we'll get this one rollin quick. so if ya got stories,diary entries of photos of the days happenings during the civil war please feel free to add.
 
May 4, 2008

Today in
U.S. Civil War History



1862 - General John B. Magruder abandoned Yorktown. Union forces under General George McClellan had established siege lines on April 5.

1863 - The Battle of Chancellorsville entered its fourth day.

1864 - The Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River. The next day General Robert E. Lee attacked Union General Ulysses S. Grant.

1864 - The House of Representatives approved the Wade-Davis Reconstruction Bill.

1865 - Outside Springfield, Illinois, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln was laid to rest in Oak Ridge Cemetery.
 
May1st-6th

since im coming in late on this one ill just add the whole battle and details in one post. long read but worth it in my opinion.

The Battle of Chancellorsville was a major battle of the American Civil War, fought near the village of Spotsylvania Courthouse, Virginia, from April 30 to May 6, 1863.[1] The battle pitted Union Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's Army of the Potomac against an army half its size, Gen. Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. It is known as Lee's "perfect battle"[3] because of his risky but successful division of his army in the presence of a much larger enemy force. Lee's audacity and Hooker's timid performance in combat combined to result in a significant Union defeat. The Confederate victory was tempered by the mortal wounding of Lt. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson to friendly fire, a loss that Lee likened to "losing my right arm."

The Chancellorsville campaign began with the crossing of the Rappahannock River by the Union army on the morning of April 27, 1863. Crossing the Rapidan River via Germanna and Ely's Fords, the Federals concentrated near Chancellorsville on April 30 and May 1. Heavy fighting began on May 1 and did not end until the Union forces retreated across the river on the night of May 5 to May 6.

Forces and plans

The Chancellorsville campaign began with the potential of leading to one of the most lopsided clashes in the war. The Union army brought an effective fighting force of 133,868 men onto the field at the start of the fighting; the Confederate army numbered less than half that figure, at 60,892.[4] Furthermore, the Union forces were much better supplied and were well-rested after several months of inactivity. Lee's forces, on the other hand, were scattered all over the state of Virginia. In fact, some 15,000 men of the Army of Northern Virginia under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, stationed near Norfolk dealing with a Federal threat at Suffolk, failed to arrive in time to aid Lee's outmanned forces.

Moreover, the engagement began with a Union battle plan superior to most of the previous efforts by Army of the Potomac commanders. The army started from its winter quarters around Fredericksburg, where it faced Lee across the Rappahannock. Hooker planned a bold double envelopment of Lee's forces, sending four corps on a stealthy march northwest, turning south to cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, turning east, and striking Lee in his rear. The remaining corps would strike Lee's front through Fredericksburg. Meanwhile, some 7,500 cavalry under Maj. Gen. George Stoneman were to raid deep into the Confederate rear areas, destroying crucial supply depots along the railroad from the Confederate capital in Richmond to Fredericksburg, which would cut Lee's lines of communication and supply. This bold, aggressive plan was later known as Stoneman's Raid.

However, despite its superior forces and sound strategy, the Army of the Potomac's lack of competent leadership doomed its forces, as in earlier campaigns of the war. The superior tactical skills of the Confederate leaders Lee and Jackson won the day.

On April 27 and April 28, the four corps of the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers in several places, most of them near the confluence of the two rivers and the hamlet of Chancellorsville, which was little more than a large mansion, owned by the Frances Chancellor family, at the junction of the Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road. In the meantime, the second force of more than 30,000 men, under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, crossed the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and Stoneman's cavalry began its movement to reach Lee's rear areas.

By May 1, Hooker had approximately 70,000 men concentrated in and around Chancellorsville. From his Fredericksburg headquarters, Lee decided to violate one of the generally accepted Principles of War and divide his force in the face of a superior enemy, hoping that aggressive action would allow him to attack and defeat a portion of Hooker's army before it could be fully concentrated against him. He left behind a brigade under Brig. Gen. William Barksdale on heavily fortified Marye's Heights and one division, 12,000 men under Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, on Prospect Hill to resist any advance by Sedgwick's corps, and he ordered Stonewall Jackson to march west and link up with Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, assembling 40,000 men to confront Hooker at Chancellorsville. Fortunately for the Confederates, heavy fog along the Rappahannock masked some of these westward movements and Sedgwick chose to wait until he could determine the enemy's intentions

Battle

May 1 – May 2
Chancellorsville battle on May 1 and 2 Confederate Union
At the same time the Jackson was marching west to join with Anderson on the morning of May 1, Hooker ordered an advance to the east to strike Anderson, pushing his men out of the impenetrable thickets and scrub pine that characterized the area. This was seen by many Union commanders as a key to victory. If the larger Union army fought in the woods, known as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, its huge advantage in artillery would be minimized, since artillery could not be used to any great effect in the Wilderness. Fighting began between the Confederate division of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and the rightmost division of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade's V Corps, under Maj. Gen. George Sykes. Sykes began an orderly withdrawal, covered by Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's division.

Despite being in a potentially favorable situation, Hooker halted his brief offensive. His actions may have demonstrated his lack of confidence in handling the complex actions of such a large organization for the first time (he had been an effective and aggressive division and corps commander in previous battles), but he had also decided before beginning the campaign that he would fight the battle defensively, forcing Lee, with his small army, to attack Hooker's larger one. At the [First] Battle of Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862), the Union army had done the attacking and met with a bloody defeat. Hooker knew Lee could not sustain such a defeat and keep an effective army in the field, so he ordered his men to withdraw back into the Wilderness and take a defensive position around Chancellorsville, daring Lee to attack him or retreat with superior forces at his back.

Lee accepted Hooker's gambit and planned an attack for May 2. On the night before, Lee and Lt. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, came up with a risky plan that would once again split his already divided army. Jackson would lead his Second Corps of 28,000 men around to attack the Union right flank. Lee, on the other hand, would exercise personal command of the other 12,000 (the other half of Longstreet's First Corps, commanded directly by Lee during the battle) facing Hooker's entire 70,000 man force at Chancellorsville.

For this to work, several things had to happen. First, Jackson had to make a 12-mile (19 km) march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected. Second, Lee had to hope that Hooker stayed tamely on the defensive. Third, Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up in Fredericksburg. And when Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.

Incredibly, all of this happened. Confederate cavalry under Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart kept the Union forces from spotting Jackson on his long flank march, which took almost all day. The only sighting came shortly after Jackson's corps disengaged from Union forces south of Chancellorsville, and this worked to the Confederates' advantage—Hooker thought that his cavalry under Stoneman had cut Lee's supply line and that Lee was about to retreat. Therefore, he stayed right where he was and never contemplated an all-out attack, sending only his III Corps of 13,000 men under Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles forward. Sickles captured a handful of Second Corps men and then stopped.

Over at Fredericksburg, Sedgwick and Hooker were unable to communicate with one another because of a failure of telegraph lines. When Hooker finally got an order to Sedgwick late on the evening of May 2 ordering him to attack Early, Sedgwick failed to do so because he mistakenly believed Early had more men than he did.

But what led most of all to the impending Union disaster was the incompetent commander of the Union XI Corps, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Howard, whose 11,000 men were posted at the far right of the Union line, failed to make any provision for his defense in case of a surprise attack, even though Hooker ordered him to do so. The Union right flank was not anchored on any natural obstacle, and the only defenses against a flank attack consisted of two cannons pointing out into the Wilderness. Also, the XI Corps was a poorly trained unit made up almost entirely of German immigrants, many of whom did not speak English.

At 4:30 p.m., Jackson's 28,000 men came running out of the Wilderness and hit Howard's corps by surprise while most of them were cooking dinner. More than 4,000 of them were taken prisoner without firing a shot, and most of the remainder were routed. Only one division of the XI Corps made a stand, and it was soon driven off as well. By nightfall, the Confederate Second Corps had advanced more than two miles (3 km), to within sight of Chancellorsville, and was separated from Lee's men only by Sickles' corps, which remained where it had been after attacking that morning. Hooker suffered a minor injury during the peak of the fighting when a Confederate cannonball hit a wooden pillar he was leaning against at his headquarters. Although practically incapacitated, Hooker refused to turn over command temporarily to his second-in-command, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch, and this failure affected Union performance over the next day and contributed to Hooker's lack of nerve and timid performance throughout the rest of the battle.

Both Hooker and Jackson made serious errors that night, and for Jackson, his mistake cost him his life.

Hooker, concerned about Sickles' ability to hold what was now a salient into the Confederate lines, pulled the III Corps back to Chancellorsville that night. This gave the Confederates two advantages—it reunited Jackson and Lee's forces, and it gave them control of an elevated clearing in the woods known as Hazel Grove, one of the few places in which artillery could be used effectively. (Sickles was quite bitter about giving up this high ground; his insubordinate actions at the Peach Orchard in the Battle of Gettysburg two months later were probably influenced strongly by this incident.)

Jackson's mistake came when he was scouting ahead of his corps along the Orange Plank Road that night. Having won a huge victory that day, Jackson wanted to press his advantage before Hooker and his army could regain their bearings and plan a counterattack, which might still succeed because of the sheer disparity in numbers. He rode out onto the plank road that night, unrecognized by men of the Second Corps behind him, and was hit by friendly fire. The wound was not life-threatening, but Jackson contracted pneumonia after his arm was amputated, and he died on May 10. His death was a devastating loss for the Confederacy.

May 3
Chancellorsville battle on May 3

On May 3, Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, who had taken command of the Second Corps following Jackson's injuries, was incapacitated. Hill consulted with Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the next most senior general in the corps, and Rodes acquiesced in Hill's decision to summon J. E. B. Stuart to take command, notifying Lee after the fact. The daring cavalryman proved to be a fine infantry commander as well. Stuart launched a massive assault all along the front, aided by Hooker who was withdrawing troops from Hazel Grove, and then set up artillery on the spot to bombard Union artillerists. Fierce fighting broke out that evening when Stuart launched another massive assault against the Union lines, which were slowly crumbling from the pressure and a lack of resupply and reinforcements. By that afternoon, the Confederates had captured Chancellorsville, and Hooker pulled his battered men back to a line of defense circling United States Ford, their last remaining open line of retreat.

Still, Lee could not declare victory, and Hooker was not conceding defeat either. During the peak of the fighting at Chancellorsville on May 3, he again called on Sedgwick to break through and attack Lee's rear. Again that general delayed until it was too late. That afternoon, he finally did attack Early's position (after Early at one point abandoned it himself thanks to a misinterpreted order from Lee), and broke through. But he did it too late in the day to help Hooker. In fact, a single brigade of Alabama troops led by Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox staged a delaying action along the Orange Plank Road west of Fredericksburg and slowed Sedgwick's already-sluggish advance. Reinforcements under Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws arrived from Chancellorsville late in the afternoon and joined Wilcox at Salem Church, four miles (6 km) west of Fredericksburg, and the combined Confederate force halted Sedgwick's march to Chancellorsville.

The fighting on May 3, 1863, was some of the most furious anywhere in the war and would have ranked among the bloodiest battles of the Civil War by itself. About 18,000 men, divided equally between the two armies, fell that day.

May 4 – May 6

On the evening of May 3 and all day May 4, Hooker remained in his defenses while Lee and Early battled Sedgwick. Sedgwick, after breaking Early's defenses, foolishly neglected to secure Fredericksburg. Early simply marched back and reoccupied the heights west of the city, cutting Sedgwick off. Meanwhile, Lee directed the division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson from the Chancellorsville front and reinforced McLaws before Sedgwick realized just how few men were opposing him. Sedgwick, as it turned out, was as resolute on the defensive as he was irresolute on the attack, and he stood his ground that day before withdrawing back across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford during the pre-dawn hours of May 5. This was another miscommunication between him and Hooker; the commanding general had wanted Sedgwick to hold Banks's Ford, so that Hooker could withdraw from the Chancellorsville area and re-cross the river at Banks's to fight again. When he learned that Sedgwick had retreated back over the river, Hooker felt he was out of options to save the campaign, and on the night of May 5 – May 6, he also withdrew back across the river.
 

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Looks like may 2nd, Stonewall just got hit by friendly fire by a picket with a case of the jitters!
 
Just a bit of trivia, but im told that if you look at photos of Civil war dead (both sides) that you will notice a lot of the dead mens shirts pulled up from there waist. This im told is where men who were not killed out right would look to see if they were gut shot. A horrible death that could take a couple of days to kill them and a death they all feared.
 
The Battle of the Wilderness
5th May 1864
The Army of the Potomac crossed the Rappahannock on 4 May but was forced to stop in the Wilderness to wait for the supply train to catch up. That afternoon Hancock's 11 Corps bivouacked at Chancellorsville, Warren's V Corps was at Old Wilderness Tavern, and the cavalry divisions of Gregg and J. H. Wilson were forward at Piney Branch Church and Parker's Store, respectively. The Federals had detected some enemy activity along the road from Orange C.H. Lee, who had anticipated Grant's movement and had resolved to hit the Federals while they were in the difficult Wilderness terrain, had Ewell's corps on the Orange Turnpike, and A. P. Hill (minus R. H. Anderson's division) on the Plank Road. The head of Ewell's column was at Locust Grove, little more than three miles from Warren, while A. P. Hill was but slightly more distant from J. H. Wilson. Yet neither army seemed aware of the other's proximity. Longstreet's corps had been at Mechanicsville, and Stuart's cavalry at Fredericksburg; both were moving in to join the rest of the Army of Northern Va. R.H. Anderson's division (A. P. Hill) was near Orange C.H.
At 6 P.m. 4 May Grant issued orders to continue the march at 5 o'clock the next morning through the Wilderness to the southeast. Burnside's IX Corps had also been ordered up from its previous mission of guarding the Orange and Alexandria R. R. Sedgwick's VI Corps was just across the Rappahannock. The stage was set.
At 7:15 A.m. 5 May Warren reported a considerable enemy force on the turnpike about two miles from Wilderness Tavern. He was ordered to attack what Grant and Meade believed to be no more than a division.
Crawford, whose division (3, V) had advanced to the Chewning farm, was ordered to hold his position, but to be prepared to send one brigade to support Warren. About noon Griffin (1, V) attacked, routed John M. Jones's brigade of Johnson's division, and then advanced against Battle's and Doles's brigades of Rodes's division (south of the turnpike). Jones was killed. In this advance, however, his right flank became exposed and was attacked by Gordon and Daniel. The Federal brigade of Ayres (1, 1, V) was driven back and Griffin had to pull back his entire line. Stafford was mortally wounded and Pegram wounded. Wright's division (1, VI) had been ordered to move from Spotswood to fall in on Griffin's right for this attack and protect his flank, but had not been able to get up in time. He arrived about 3 P.m. and then repulsed an attack by two brigades of Edward Johnson's division. On the other flank Wadsworth's division (4, V) had been ordered to reinforce Griffin's south flank, but it got lost and was driven back in disorder when its right flank was hit by the advancing brigades of Gordon and Daniel. This created a gap through which the Confederates advanced and overpowered Denison's brigade of Robinson's division (3, 2, V). McCandless' brigade (1, 3, V) had also been ordered to form on Wadsworth's left, but Wadsworth had moved out before McCandless could make contact with him. McCandless collided with the forces of Gordon that had just defeated Denison and was also defeated with considerable loss after a heavy engagement. Ewell then dug in along the line where contact had first been made. Opposite him Warren formed (south of the pike) and Sedgwick (minus Getty) extended the line north of the pike.
To the south, along the Plank Road, the 5th N.Y. and 3d Pa. Cav. were left to outpost Parker's Store while Wilson moved with the rest of his division southwest toward Craig's Meeting House. Kirkland's brigade of Heth's division led A. P. Hill's advance along the Plank Road and drove the Federals toward Wilderness Tavern. Getty's division (2, VI), which had been marching southeast through the latter crossroads at 9 A.M.,was sent to stop this enemy advance. At the same time Hancock's corps was ordered to halt in the vicinity of Todd's Tavern. However, in accordance with his earlier orders, Hancock was already two miles beyond the tavern toward Shady Grove Church, and had to countermarch. Getty reached the intersection of the Brock and Plank roads just in time to stop Heth's advance. Both sides then dug in. D. D. Birney's division (3, 11) arrived at 2 P.m. and formed to Getty's south; Mott, Gibbon, and Barlow followed and extended the line to the south. Baxter's brigade (2, 2, V) arrived late in the afternoon. A. P. Hill, meanwhile, had been building up his own line and extending north to link up with Ewell; at the same time he was anxiously awaiting the expected arrival of Longstreet behind him. Longstreet, however, had delayed his advance while getting permission to move via the Catharpin Road instead of the Plank Road as Lee had ordered; the result was that he did not arrive in time for the first day's fighting.
Hancock had also wasted time digging a defensive position before attacking A. P. Hill. Getty attacked at 4:15, after delaying an hour to shift position to make room for Hancock. Although he gained ground with the assistance of Ricketts' battery against the center of Heth's position, he was repulsed on both flanks. The brigade of Col. Lewis A. Grant (2, 2, VI) lost almost 50 per cent. Hancock reinforced with the divisions of D. B. Birney (along the road) and Mott (against the enemy's right); later he committed Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division (3, 2, II) to the right of the Plank Road in support of Eustis' brigade of Getty's division (4, 2, VI). "There was never more desperate fighting than now ensued," wrote E. P. Alexander. During the action Wilcox' division reinforced Heth. About 5:30 P.m. the Confederates attacked and gained about 50 yards. Two of Barlow's brigades then charged and drove back Hill's right. At 8 p.m., after dark, the fighting stopped. Five Federal divisions (38.000 men) had failed to dislodge A.P. Hill's two divisions (14,000).
Wadsworth's division (4, V) had been ordered from the north to reinforce Hancock by attacking Hill's exposed left. It was unable to find its way through the difficult underbrush in time to be effective.
Along the turnpike there had been heavy skirmishing. About 5 P.m. the brigades of Seymour (2, 3, VI), Neill (3, 2, VI), and part of Wright's 1st brig. (under W. H. Penrose) attacked the strongly-entrenched brigades of Hays and Pegram south of Flat Run. Neill and Penrose were repulsed with heavy loss by guns Pegram had located so as to enfilade their lines. Seymour attacked until darkness without being able to break through.
Since he expected Longstreet to arrive soon to relieve his tired troops on the Orange Plank Road, A. P. Hill made the mistake of disapproving the urgent recommendation of Heth that earthworks be constructed in this sector in preparation for the anticipated continuation of Federal attacks.
Not having identified either Longstreet's corps or R. H. Anderson's division during the day's fighting, Grant ordered a general attack to start at dawn of 6 May. During the night Burnside's IX corps hurried up to reinforce Hancock, while Longstreet and Anderson moved to reinforce A.P. Hill.
At 5 A.M. Birney attacked with the support of Getty and two of Gibbon's brigades. Mott advanced toward Hill's right. Wadsworth, who had made contact with Hill's left about dark of the preceding day, was to attack in that area. Birney was stopped when he came up against Hill's line, but then succeeded in enveloping it from the south while Wadsworth made progress against the other flank, The Confederates were about to be routed when Field's and Kershaw's divisions of Longstreet's corps arrived and formed a new defensive line.
Gibbon was in command of a force on the Federal south flank along the Brock Road to guard against an expected advance by Longstreet from this direction. In compliance with an order to attack the Confederate south flank with Barlow's division, Gibbon had sent forward only Frank's brigade (3, 1. II). After hard fighting this unit made contact with Mott's left. Due to the difficult terrain Burnside's two divisions were late. At about 8 o'clock Stevenson's division of this corps reported to Hancock and Hancock was informed at about the same time that Burnside with the two other divisions was in position to attack on his right. Actually Burnside did not get into position until 2 P.m.
Shortly before 9 A.m. Hancock resumed his attack along the Plank Road with Birney, Mott, Wadsworth, part of Stevenson's division, and three brigades of Gibbon's division. Having heard firing to his south, Hancock sent Brooke's brigade (4, 1, 11) to guard the Brock Road against a possible approach of Longstreet. Actually, the latter was at this moment on Hancock's front; the firing to the south was a skirmish between Sheridan's and Stuart's cavalry at TODD's TAVERN. The concern over an attack from this area was further heightened when a column was reported advancing on the Brock Road. This turned out to be a group of Federal convalescents who were trying to rejoin their units. While Hancock diverted strength to guard his left, Burnside's attack failed to materialize on his right. By about 9:45 A.M. Longstreet had pushed Hancock back to his line of departure.
Looking for a way to take the offensive, Longstreet learned of an unfinished railroad cut that would provide a covered approach for attacking the Federal south flank. He put his adjutant, Lt. Col. G. Moxley Sorrel, in command of four brigades to make this attempt. The brigades were those of Wofford, G. T. Anderson, Davis, and Mahone. (Many accounts, e. g., Steele, state that Mahone was in command.) Sorrel attacked at 11 A.M., and overwhelmed the Federal flank. Frank's brigade, almost out of ammunition when the attack started, withdrew under heavy pressure; the left of Mott's division then was forced back. Wadsworth was killed while trying to rally his troops. On Birney's suggestion the line was withdrawn to the Brock Road. When Longstreet learned of Sorrel's success, he ordered forward the brigades of Benning, Law, and Gregg. Mahone's men fired by mistake on their own troops, killing Micah Jenkins and seriously wounding Longstreet. (This occurred within five miles of where Stonewall Jackson had been mortally wounded under similar circumstances almost exactly a year before.) Longstreet ordered Field to assume command and press the attack. Lee, however, arrived and ordered this advance delayed until the lines could be straightened out.
There was little fighting in this area between 11 o'clock and 4 P.m. Burnside finally arrived, attacked near the Tapp House, took some ground, but was driven back by reinforcements from Heth's division and Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's division. Before Burnside and Hancock could comply with their orders to attack at 6 P.m.. Lee took the initiative. At 4:15 the Confederates advanced to the abatis 100 yards from the Federals' first line of defense and brought it under heavy musket fire. The Federal line held for half an hour; then Ward's brigade (1, 3, 11) and part of Mott's division broke. Brush fires had started and Hancock reported that portions of the breastworks were burning so that they could not be defended. Although the Confederates planted their flags over the captured works they were then driven back by Carroll's brigade, supported by Dow's battery. Burnside attacked again but accomplished no more than keeping Heth and Wilcox from moving to Lee's support.
To the north Sedgwick and Warren had attacked repeatedly and failed to penetrate Ewell's lines. Gordon had found the exposed Federal right flank, but Ewell had refused him permission to attack it. When Lee visited this portion of the front at 5:30 P.m. he ordered the attack made. Gordon's brigade, supported by part of Robert Johnston's, attacked Sedgwick's exposed right flank just before dark, while Pegram's brigade attacked frontally. Shaler's brigade (4, 1, VI) was driven back on Seymour's (2, 3, VI) and both of these Federal generals were captured with several hundred men. Johnston reached Wright's rear and captured some prisoners before being ejected from the Federal position. Both sides then entrenched. Brush fires had become such a problem that the fighting stopped at several points throughout the day by mutual consent while soldiers of both sides cooperated in trying to save the wounded. During the night of 7-8 May about 200 men were suffocated or burned to death.
After dark Grant's forces withdrew and both armies maneuvered toward their next encounter at Spotsylvania, 7-20 May '64.
The Federals lost an estimated 17,666 out of 101,895 (exclusive of cavalry) engaged; of these, 2,246 were killed and 12,073 wounded. Generals Wadsworth and Alexander Hays were killed, Getty and Carroll wounded, and Shaler and Seymour captured. Confederate effective strength is estimated at 61,025. Although there are no complete casualty reports, Livermore estimates that the Confederates lost a total of 7,750. Gens. Jenkins and J. M. Jones were killed, Stafford mortally wounded, Longstreet, Pegram, Hunter, and Benning were wounded.
 

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The battle of Williamsburg also began on this day in 1862. here is a battle report.

I have cobbled together this short description of the fighting at Williamsburg to focus in on the actions of the 26th PA's Brigade and Division. This overview is not meant to fully describe all the fighting that took place at Williamsburg, but to give a little idea of what the men of the 26th faced. During the battle and the remainder of the Penisula Campaign, the 26th was formed as part of Grover's 1st Brigade, Hooker's 2nd Division, of Heintzelman's 3rd Corps.

The battle of Williamsburg is often thought of as a skirmish, when compared to the bigger battles of the Civil War. It is frequently described as a seesaw battle of charge and counter charge resulting in a draw. However, for many of the men of the 26th as well much of the Army of the Potomac, this was their first chance to "see the elephant". The horrors of battle were brought to the fore front as comrades were captured, wounded, and killed. The battle was fought on a hot and miserable rainy day on muddy, slippery ground, May 5th 1862.

The 26th had participated in the siege of Yorktown from April 5th until May 4th. This was a difficult ordeal with men working on fatigue details and near constant exposure to the elements. Sgt Hutchinson of the 11th Mass describes the siege like this, "The men were... ...employed daily, working in the trenches, and building bridges and making roads... ...the constant reverberation of artillery and musketry, robbing the men of refreshing sleep, the turning out to form in line of battle at all hours of the day and night, the continued labor upon the earthworks and roads, the arduous picket duty and exposure during almost continuous rains, combined to render our burdens almost insupportable..."1. The battle of Williamsburg was initiated as McClellan began to push his troops forward in pursuit of Confederate forces leaving the defenses of Yorktown on May 4th. "The division led by Gen. Hooker forming the infantry advance, in heavy marching order, with three days’ rations, pushed forward upon the Yorktown Road at noon to support the cavalry, which was pursuing the retreating rebel forces in the direction of Williamsburg."2 Due to congested roads and detours taken by the Division, the men of the 26th marched until midnight before stopping to rest. The battle would start early the next morning after the men suffered through a wet night. Captain Henry Blake of the 11th Massachusettes remarked "...the cartridges in the muskets had been wet by the storm, although every exertion had been made to prevent this result; and the snapping of percussion-caps was more frequent than the whistling of bullets. Whenever there was a cessation in the rain during the remainder of the day, the men were continually drawing their ruined charges, and cleaning the guns in the turmoil of the battle."3

The Confederates under General Joseph E. Johnston, were fighting a delaying action in order to gain time for their baggage train to make it's way towards Richmond. The Confederates chose to hold their ground along a defensive line of earthen works some 8 miles east of Williamsburg, where the Queen's and College creeks narrowed the length of ground requiring defense. The main position of this defense was Fort Magruder, "an elongated pentagon with walls fifteen feet high and nine feet thick, surrounded by a moat nine feet deep"4. Fort Magruder stood in the center of the line and guarded the approaches of the Hampton and Yorktown roads to Williamsburg. Fort Magruder was in turn protected by 13 smaller redoubts stretching across the entire peninsula.

Hooker's Division started it's attack on the Confederates forces (Longstreet's Division) defending Fort Magruder and the nearby redoubts early in the morning hours. At first, Hooker's men drove in the enemy skirmishers but were soon held up by rifle and artillery fire from the fort and redoubts. Sgt Hutchinson of the 11th Massachusettes describes the scene as such "...Redoubts, extending across the peninsula, had been built upon the plain, the open space, half a mile in width, in which many rifle pits had been dug for sharpshooters, being bounded by a forest, a belt of which had been felled, forming an abatis which no organized body of troops could penetrate." 5. The regiments of the brigade were deployed upon both sides of the Hampton Road, the 26th along with the 11th Massachusettes were sent up the right side of the road and were given orders to attempt to connect with General Sumner's Corps. To the best of my knowledge, General Sumner's Corps was in the rear of the federal lines in reserve. The intent of this order probably was for the 26th and 11th to find the flank of Smith's Division (Keyes 4th Corps) which the 26th eventualy did, finding themselves on the extreme right of the brigade. As the day progressed, Longstreet launched counter attacks which nearly turned Hooker's left flank. Grover received orders to move his brigade to the left to aid in the defense of these attacks. The 26th being on the extreme right of the brigade did not receive the orders and remained in their position near Smith's Division. The 26th eventually spent the remainder of the day in the reserve of General Peck's Brigade (Couch's Division, Keyes Corps) which came onto the battle line some time after noon. General Peck writes in his report "Early in the afternoon I found a regiment of General Grover's, Hooker's division, moving back along the Williamsburg road. The officers stated that the ammunition was getting short and that the enemy was driving in the front. This regiment remained inactive within my lines, as I did not wish to disturb arrangements of General Hooker."6 Around 4 p.m., General Kearny's 3rd Division, of Heintzelman's Corps, arrived just in time to save Hooker's position and pushed Longstreet's men back into their earthworks and stabilized the 3rd Corps line. The day ended with Hancock's 1st Brigade, of Smith's 2nd Division, Keyes' 4th Corps, making assaults on the Confederate left flank and taking redoubts No. 12 & 13. That night the Confederate's moved out of their positions, having bought sufficient time for their baggage trains departure. Both sides claimed victory. Federal forces held the ground while the Confederates were able to make a strategic withdrawal.

The battle reports of the Regimental, Brigade, Division, and Corps Commanders are somewhat confusing and conflicting at times. It appears General Peck's report made it back to General Heintzelman who interpreted the 26th's actions as near cowardness. We may never know precisely what happened on that day to the 26th and who's depiction of the 26th's actions is correct. I am sure the truth lies somewhere in between as it typically does when there are conflicting stories. Samuel Bates gives the following description of the 26th's actions at Williamsburg.

"Upon the evacuation of Yorktown, Hooker's Division marched in pursuit; but for want of orders from the headquarters of the army, necessary to give precedence, its march was cut off by other divisions, under senior officers, crossing the road, and, after waiting many hours it was forced to make a long detour. It was nearly midnight when the Twenty-sixth reached the bivouac in front of the redoubts near Williamsburg.
The division moved at early dawn on the 5th of May, and the engagement commenced at 7 o'clock, a.m. Colonel Small was ordered by General Hooker to occupy the Yorktown and Williamsburg turnpike, and open communication with Sumner's Corps. The road was found clear of the enemy, who had, however, skirmishers in a line of rifle-pits in front of Fort Magruder. Colonel Small deployed five companies as skirmishers, and drove the enemy back into the fort, but was himself severely wounded and carried from the field. The command devolved upon Major Berry, and the regiment remained in the road at the edge of the slashing, about eight hundred yards from the fort, until 4 o'clock, p.m., when it was relieved by fresh troops, and a complete victory was achieved. The loss in the Twenty-sixth in this engagement was eight killed, twenty-three wounded, and three taken prisoners - a loss but slight compared to that of the remainder of the division, owing to its position on the extreme right, while the main attack of the enemy was on the left. It afterwards appeared that General Hooker had sent orders to move the regiment to the left, which had never reached the officer in command.
The division remained at Williamsburg about two weeks after the battle, the Twenty-sixth being detailed to take charge of rebel prisoners and to do provost guard duty in the town…."7

The reports from the Official Records of the Regimental, Brigade, Division, and Corps commanders follow
 
yup got a lil lost. thanks to carol for findin me ;) glad you enjoy the history lessons.
 
May 6, 1864
Grant and Lee continue fighting in the Wilderness

On this day, Union and Confederate troops continue their desperate struggle in the Wilderness, which was the opening battle in the biggest campaign of the war. General Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the Union forces, had joined George Meade's Army of the Potomac to encounter Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in the tangled Wilderness forest near Chancellorsville, the site of Lee's brilliant victory the year before. The fighting was intense, and raging fires that consumed the dead and wounded magnified the horror of battle. But little was gained in the confused attacks by either side.

On May 6, the second day of battle in the Wilderness, Grant sought to break the stalemate by sending Winfield Hancock's corps against the Confederate right flank at the southern end of the battle line. The Federals were on the verge of breaking through the troops of James Longstreet when they stumbled in the dense undergrowth.

Lee entered the fray to rally the Confederate troops, but his devoted solders urged him away from the action. Later in the morning, Longstreet's men attacked Hancock's forces and seemed poised to turn the Union flank. But, like the Union troops earlier, they became disoriented as they drove Hancock's troops back. In the confusion, Longstreet was wounded by his own men, just four miles from the spot where Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men the year before.

The Confederate attack halted when Hancock's men found refuge behind hastily constructed breastworks. In the evening, Lee attacked the Union flank at the northern end of the battlefield and nearly turned the Federal line. Grant's men, however, held their ground, leaving the exhausted armies in nearly the same positions as when the battle began. In two days, the Union lost 17,000 men to the Confederates' 11,000. This was nearly one-fifth of each army.

Unfortunately, the worst was yet to come. Grant pulled his men out of the Wilderness on May 7, but, unlike the commanders before him in the eastern theater, he did not go back. He moved further south towards Spotsylvania Court House and closer to Richmond. At Spotsylvania, the armies staged some of the fiercest fighting of the war.
 
May 7, 1864
Grant leaves the Wilderness for Spotsylvania

Following two days of intense fighting in the Wilderness forest, the Army of the Potomac, under the command of Union General Ulysses S. Grant, moves south. Grant's forces had clashed with Confederate General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in a pitched and confused two-day battle in which neither side gained a clear victory. Nonetheless, Lee could claim an advantage, since he inflicted more casualties and held off the Yankees, despite the fact that he was outnumbered.

When Lee halted Grant's advance, Grant proved that he was different than previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac by refusing to fall back. Many of his veteran soldiers expected to retreat back across the Rapidan River, but the order came down through the ranks to move the army south. The blue troops had just suffered terrible losses, and the move lifted their spirits. "We marched free. The men began to sing," recalled one Yankee.

In some ways, warfare would never be the same. Grant had promised President Abraham Lincoln that there would be no turning back on this campaign. He would aggressively pursue Lee without allowing the Confederates time to retool. But the cost was high: Weeks of fighting resulted in staggering casualties before the two armies dug in around Petersburg by the middle of June.
 
On this day in Civil War History, Stonewall Jackson dies from his wounds recieved days prior.
 

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I think this also happened on May 10th, 1865:
President Jefferson Davis was captured near Irwinville, Georgia
 
sorry i missed a couple days there. was working 14hrs a day. but here todays. thanks western for pickin up the slack.

May 11, 1864
Confederate Cavalry General J.E.B. Stuart is mortally wounded

A dismounted Union trooper fatally wounds J.E.B. Stuart, one of the most colorful generals of the South, at the Battle of Yellow Tavern, just six miles north of Richmond. Stuart died the next day.

During the 1864 spring campaign in Virginia, General Ulysses S. Grant applied constant pressure on Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. In early May, the two armies clashed in the Wilderness and again at Spotsylvania Court House as they lurched southward toward Richmond. Meanwhile, Grant sent General Phil Sheridan and his cavalry on a raid deep behind Confederate lines. The plan was to cut Lee's supply line and force him out of the trenches in retreat. Sheridan's troops wreaked havoc on the Rebel rear as they tore up railroad tracks, destroyed supply depots, and held off the Confederate cavalry in several engagements, including the Battle of Yellow Tavern.

Although Sheridan's Federal troops held the field at the end of the day, his forces were stretched thin. Richmond could be taken, Sheridan wrote later, but it could not be held. He began to withdraw back to the north.

The death of Stuart was a serious blow to Lee. He was a great cavalry leader, and his leadership was part of the reason the Confederates had a superior cavalry force in Virginia during most of the war. Yet Stuart was not without his faults: He had been surprised by a Union attack at the Battle of Brandy Station in 1863, and failed to provide Lee with crucial information at Gettysburg. Stuart's death, like Stonewall Jackson's the year before, seriously affected Lee's operations.
 
cilvil War history-- this Day

Man! Relic Hunter---Sure is goood to see you back-missed you and your Civil War facts and stories--Thanks Carol for finding him:wow::yes::yes:
 
Thank you Joe.

May 12, 1864
Bloody day at the Bloody Angle

Close-range firing and hand-to-hand combat at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia, result in one of the most brutal battles of the Civil War. After the Battle of the Wilderness (May 5-6), Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee raced respective Union and Confederate forces southward. Grant aimed his army a dozen miles southeast of the Wilderness, toward the critical crossroads of Spotsylvania Court House. Sensing Grant's plan, Lee sent part of his army on a furious night march to secure the road junction before the Union soldiers got there. The Confederates soon constructed a five-mile long system of entrenchments in the shape of an inverted U.

On May 10, Grant began to attack Lee's position at Spotsylvania. After achieving a temporary breakthrough at the Rebel center, Grant was convinced that a weakness existed there, as the bend of the Confederate line dispersed their fire. At dawn on May 12, Union General Winfield Scott Hancock's troops emerged from the fog and overran the Rebel trenches, taking nearly 3,000 prisoners and more than a dozen cannons. While the Yankees erupted in celebration, the Confederates counterattacked and began to drive the Federals back. The battle raged for over 20 hours along the center of the Confederate line—the top of the inverted U—which became known as the "Bloody Angle." Lee's men eventually constructed a second line of defense behind the original Rebel trenches, and fighting ceased just before dawn on May 13.

Around the Bloody Angle, the dead lay five deep, and bodies had to be moved from the trenches to make room for the living. The action around Spotsylvania shocked even the grizzled veterans of the two great armies. Said one officer, "I never expect to be fully believed when I tell what I saw of the horrors of Spotsylvania."

And yet the battle was not done; the armies slugged it out for another week. In spite of his losses, Grant persisted, writing to General Henry Halleck in Washington, "I will fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."
 
Nice stories Relic! I was wondering how many here on the site had kin that fought during war ?
 
Nice stories Relic! I was wondering how many here on the site had kin that fought during war ?

id say a good percentage of the members here had kin in the war. my family had a few in the war on both the CS and US side the only famous one was Jesse James who was a guerrilla fighter who supported the confederates.
 
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